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Abstract
The evolution of large-scale cooperation among genetic strangers is a fundamental unanswered question in the
social sciences. Behavioral economics has persuasively shown that so called ‘strong reciprocity’ plays a key
role in accounting for the endogenous enforcement of cooperation. Insofar as strongly reciprocal players are
willing to costly sanction defectors, cooperation flourishes. However, experimental evidence unambiguously
indicates that not only defection and strong reciprocity, but also unconditional cooperation is a quantitatively
important behavioral attitude. By referring to a prisoner’s dilemma framework where punishment (‘stick’) and
rewarding (‘carrot’) options are available, here we show analytically that that the presence of cooperators who
don’t punish in the population makes altruistic punishment evolutionarily weak. We show that cooperation
breaks down and strong reciprocity is maladaptive if costly punishment means ‘punishing defectors’ and,
even more so, if it is coupled with costly rewarding of cooperators. In contrast, punishers don’t perish if
cooperators, far from being rewarded, are sanctioned. These results, based on an extended notion of strong
reciprocity, challenge evolutionary explanations of cooperation that overlook the ‘dark side’ of altruistic
behavior.
Key words: Cooperation; Strong Reciprocity; Altruistic Punishment; Altruistic Rewarding; Heterogeneous
Types.
JEL Classification: C7; D7; Z1.
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1. Introduction
Even though the evolution of cooperation among humans has been extensively studied in the last decades (see
e.g. the famous work by Axelrod, 1984), a crucial question remains largely open: how can large-scale
cooperation endogenously emerge and be successfully sustained over time? Recent research has persuasively
argued that invoking explanations based on more or less sophisticated forms of ‘enlightened self-interest’
alone, such as kin selection (Hamilton, 1964), repeated encounters (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986), and
reputation formation, is not sufficient for accounting for the evidence available about the relevance of
cooperation within several significant human contexts where collective action problems naturally arise but
interactions involve genetically unrelated individuals. As both theoretical contributions and empirical
evidence confirm, insofar as altruists are grouped together and mainly interact among themselves, within a
neighborhood structure (Eshel et al., 1998), exploitation on the part of free riders can be prevented by
restricting access to the gains from cooperation. Unlike these studies, we depart from close-knit parochial
communities and test the survival potential of pro-social behavior within a more ‘hostile’ environment where
neither group selection nor assortative interactions are allowed, and develop an evolutionary game-theoretical
analysis aimed at investigating the diffusion of cooperation when exogenous enforcement devices are not
available.
In recent years, a growing body of experimental evidence has convincingly shown that so called ‘strong
reciprocity’ is a powerful device for the enforcement of cooperation, despite the presence of large proportions
of selfish subjects (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Gintis et al., 2005; Gächter and Herrmann, 2010). The key feature
of strong reciprocators is their willingness to incur costs in order to conditionally cooperate and punish noncooperators. However, in a lively interdisciplinary debate currently involving economists, biologists and
social psychologists (see on this Fehr and Henrich, 2003), critics argue that strong reciprocity is maladaptive,
in the sense that it is evolutionarily weak and has no adaptive power (Dreber et al., 2008).
Hence, the following question naturally arises: can strong reciprocity survive and favor the enforcement
of cooperation, within a behaviorally heterogeneous population in which also non-reciprocating players are
involved? The existence of heterogeneous types is being increasingly confirmed by experimental research1. In
particular, available lab evidence indicates that (a) a significant proportion are unconditionally cooperative
(e.g. systematically cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma or make positive contributions in public goods or
dictator games) and (b) a significant proportion of subjects are self-interested and tend to free ride on others’

1

Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), by means of a new methodological strategy, both account for the existence of types in the lab
and, through a direct test of the role of social preferences in voluntary cooperation, show that a large part of the dynamics of free
riding is explained by the interaction of heterogeneous types.
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generosity (by defecting from the outset). Further, (c) most subjects who act neither purely selfishly nor
simply altruistically seem to be strong reciprocators (Carpenter et al., 2009).
However, it is worth pointing out that strong reciprocity is often viewed as something more than costly
punishment of non-cooperators: in many existing works on the theme, a strongly reciprocal player is
generically defined as a person who is willing to bear costs to be kind to those who are being kind (by
cooperating and rewarding them; strong positive reciprocity) and to be mean to those who are being mean (by
defecting and punishing them; strong negative reciprocity; Fehr et al., 2002). A relevant problem with this
definition is that it takes for granted that if a person is willing to be kind to those who are being kind, she will
also be mean to those who are being mean (or viceversa). By contrast, several experimental papers (see e.g.
Abbink et al., 2000; Offerman, 2002; Reuben and van Winden, 2010) show that strong positive reciprocity
need not be the flip-side of strong negative reciprocity. Moreover, a further extension of the notion of strong
reciprocity is in order as some new studies interestingly reveal that punishers target their sanctions not only to
defectors but also, to a significant extent, to other cooperators (Herrmann et al., 2008; Goette et al., 2010;
Abbink et al., 2010; Gächter and Herrmann, 2010). This suggests that, on both conceptual and empirical
grounds, strong reciprocity has a plural nature. In the light of this, in this paper we decompose such behavioral
attitude by introducing a taxonomy of strongly reciprocal players. Next, we comparatively lay out the
evolutionary foundations of the varieties of strong reciprocity we identify within a behaviorally heterogeneous
social environment where also unconditional defectors and unconditional cooperators are initially present.
This will allow us to explore – to our knowledge for the first time – the different medium-long run
implications which can be drawn, for society at large, depending on the variety of strong reciprocity one refers
to.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 illustrates the main features of the
analytical model. Section 3 analyzes social dynamics for each of the variants of strong reciprocity we
investigate, and contains our basic mathematical results. Section 4 discusses the main findings and concludes.

2. The Prisoner’s Dilemma with Carrot and Stick
We consider a large-scale population of individuals enjoying the benefits of a given collective (i.e. non-rival
and non-excludable) good. In this society, three player types are initially present: Unconditional Defectors
(UDs, hereafter ‘defectors’ only, for simplicity), Unconditional Cooperators (UCs, hereafter ‘cooperators’)
and Strong Reciprocators (SRs). The existence and quantitative relevance of these behavioral types is being
increasingly confirmed in laboratory environments, within the framework of prisoner’s dilemma and public
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good game experiments (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Ones and Putterman,
2007; Camera and Casari, 2009; Carpenter et al., 2009). As we anticipated above, we take the inherently
plural nature of strong reciprocity into account and model it by introducing a taxonomy of SR types. Infinitely
many random encounters occur between two individuals at a time and, whenever two players meet, their
behavior affects each other’s enjoyment of the collective good. Besides, type recognition holds: players are
supposed to be able to identify their co-player’s type in each pairwise matching2. This feature of the model is
in common with models of good standing (Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004) as well as previous evolutionary
work on altruistic punishment (Fowler, 2005). In each matching, we assume that the material consequences
for the players are captured by a two-stage Prisoner’s Dilemma with Carrot and Stick (PDCS) game. In the
first stage (the Cooperation stage), the material consequences depend on players’ choices between
‘Cooperate’ (C) and ‘Defect’ (D) only. Hence, each matching between two individuals will produce one of the
following four outcomes: (D, D), (C, C), (C, D), (D, C). We suppose that, from the viewpoint of the
individual player, the material consequences of these four possible outcomes have the structure of the
prisoner’s dilemma, with γ > α > β > δ (see the left side of Table 1). Mutual cooperation Pareto-dominates
mutual defection and free riding, by exploiting the non-excludability of the good to be provided and the
opponent’s cooperation, is the most individually rewarding outcome, in material terms. Players behave
according to their type. Hence, while UCs play C and UDs play D in each matching (regardless of the
opponent’s type), SRs play C when matched with another SR or with a UC player, and play D when matched
with a UD player (see the right side of Table 1).

C
C α,α
D γ ,δ
PD game

D

δ,γ
β, β

UC

SR

UD

α,α
SR α , α α , α
UD γ , δ β , β

δ,γ
β, β
β, β

UC α , α

Players’ material payoffs

Table 1: PD game and material payoffs (Stage 1)

In the second stage (the Punishment/Reward stage), players have to choose among Punish, P (‘stick’),
Reward, R (‘carrot’) and Neither, N (that is, abstaining from both punishment and rewarding). Each SR
chooses N if matched with a player of the same type. Further, we suppose that while both UCs and UDs
2

Though throughout the paper we retain this information assumption, it is worth pointing out that most of our results can be
obtained also if we suppose that players can observe their opponent’s type only ex post, that is after playing the first stage of the
material game.
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systematically abstain from punishing and/or rewarding others, SR types are classified according to their
choices (P, R or N) when matched with UCs and UDs (see the left side of Table 2). In particular, we
separately consider five types of players who act identically in the first stage – that is, they play C (resp., D)
when matched with either a UC or another SR (resp., a UD) – but differ as to their strategic choice in the
second stage. In particular, as the left side of Table 2 shows, we specifically focus on (1) strong negative
reciprocators (SNRs), who only punish defectors; (2) strong positive reciprocators (SPRs), who only reward
cooperators; (3) symmetric strong reciprocators (SSRs), who both punish defectors and reward cooperators;
(4) punishers of non-punishing cooperators (PNPs), who only punish cooperators and, finally, (5) hyperstrong negative reciprocators (HSNRs), who punish both cooperators and defectors3. The matrix on the right
of Table 2 provides us with the material payoffs at stage 2, where ɛ = cost of being punished, λ = cost of
punishing, π = cost of rewarding, η = benefit from being rewarded and λ , ε , π , η are strictly positive
parameters. This means that, as it is often true both in naturally occurring environments (Sethi and
Somanathan, 1996) as well as in laboratory experiments (Gächter and Herrmann, 2010), punishing (resp.,
rewarding) is a costly activity for the punisher (resp., rewarder).

UC UD

UC

UD

SNR

N

P

SNR

0,0

− λ, − ε

SPR

R

N

SPR

− π ,η

0,0

SSR

R

P

SSR

− π ,η

− λ, − ε

PNP

P

N

PNP

− λ, − ε

0,0

HSNR

P

P

SRs’ classification

HSNR − λ , − ε

− λ, − ε

SRs’ material payoffs

Table 2: SRs’ classification and material payoffs (Stage 2)

We claim that the two-stage structure of the PDCS allows us to go beyond a further limitation which
characterizes existing studies on strong reciprocity, that is their inability to sharply distinguish between
implicit and explicit forms of rewarding and punishment. With regard to rewarding, one may argue that, for
example in a prisoner’s dilemma game, deciding to cooperate with a cooperator entails in itself sacrificing
resources to be kind towards (i.e. to reward) a person being kind (strong positive reciprocity), since the same

3

Though our analysis includes forms of strong reciprocity leading to punishment of cooperators, it is worth pointing out that in this
paper we leave aside the interesting phenomenon of defectors punishing cooperators (the so called ‘antisocial punishment’). For a
recent theoretical work on the impact of anti-social punishment on the evolution of cooperation, see Rand et al. (2010).
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person would have obtained a larger material benefit by defecting (rather than by cooperating) with a
cooperating player. Analogously, defection can be seen as an implicit means of punishing defectors. The Folk
Theorem literature provides us with two famous examples of implicit punishment via defection such as Titfor-Tat and the Grim Trigger strategy. By contrast, the structure of the PDCS allows us to incorporate two
levels of punishment and rewarding into the analysis, so that strong reciprocity turns out to be a behavioral
attitude characterized by both conditional niceness (i.e. willingness to cooperate with cooperators and to
defect with defectors) and costly acts of punishment and/or rewarding4.

3. The evolutionary game-theoretical model: do punishers perish?
As we made clear in the previous section, in our evolutionary game-theoretical model player types prescribe
the behavioral patterns which, via pairwise matchings, determine specific material consequences. In turn, such
material consequences drive social evolution, in the sense that the types which turn out to be more rewarding
– in material terms – are imitated and, by replicating faster, manage to spread over at the expense of less
rewarding ones. Time is continuous and the population is modelled as a continuum of players. As far as
pairwise matchings are concerned, the material game that individuals play is the previously described twostage PDCS game. We represent the state of the population of individuals by the vector x = ( x1 , x 2 , x3 ) ∈ R 3 ,
where x1 , x 2 and x3 indicate the shares of individuals of the types UC, SR and UD, respectively. Thus
xi ≥ 0 , for all i, and

∑x

i

= 1; so x belongs to the 2-dimensional simplex S (see Figure 1). Let us indicate by

i

A the payoff matrix of the PDCS game associated with the material payoffs related to both stage 1 and stage 2
(see Tables 1 and 2), whose entries a ij depend on the specific SR type considered and represent the row
player’s payoffs corresponding to each pairwise interaction, in a UC-SR-UD population:

A=

UC

SR UD

UC

a11

a12

a13

SR

a 21

a 22

a 23

UD

a 31

a32

a 33

(1)

4

The distinction between implicit and explicit punishment and rewarding is in line with experimental evidence, indicating that
subjects often behave differently according to whether they are provided or not with explicit opportunities to directly target their
sanctions and/or rewards towards other players (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; 2005).
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Given the pairwise random matching structure of the game, the (expected) material payoffs for UCs, SRs and
UDs are, respectively:
Π UC = a11 x1 + a12 x 2 + a13 x3
Π SR = a 21 x1 + a 22 x 2 + a 23 x3
Π UD = a31 x1 + a 32 x 2 + a33 x3
Following Taylor and Jonker (1978), we assume that the growth rates x& i / xi = (dxi / dt ) / xi of the shares are
given by the well-known replicator equations (see also Weibull, 1995):

x&1 = x1 Π UC − Π

(

)

x& 2 = x 2 Π SR − Π

(

)

(

)

x& 3 = x3 Π UD − Π

(2)

where:

Π = x1Π UC + x 2 Π SR + x3 Π UD

represents the population-wide average payoff.

x3

1

e3

e2
1

x2

e1
1

x1
Figure 1: The 2-dimensional simplex S
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Our formalization allows us to directly draw implications about the social dynamics taking place within largescale three-type populations in which cooperators and defectors initially coexist with strong negative
reciprocators (SNRs), strong positive reciprocators (SPRs), symmetric strong reciprocators (SSRs), punishers
of non-punishing cooperators (PNPs) and hyper-strong negative reciprocators (HSNRs), respectively.
The dynamic system (2) is analyzed in the Mathematical Appendix by using the classification due to Bomze
(1983) for replicator equations. In the following subsections we illustrate the basic features of dynamics
generated by (2) by separately focusing on each of the five varieties of strong reciprocity under exam.
In Figures 2-6, attractive stationary states are indicated by full dots, repulsive ones by open dots and saddle
points by drawing their stable and unstable branches. The vertices e1 = (1,0,0) , e2 = (0,1,0) and e3 = (0,0,1) of
the simplex S (see Figure 1), which represent respectively the states where only types UC, SR and UD are
present in the population, are indicated by UC, SR and UD. These states are always stationary states under
replicator dynamics.

Altruistic Punishers
Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics emerging when SRs display a willingness to costly punish defectors only
(SNR), consistently with many laboratory studies (see Gintis et al., 2005), where a sizeable proportion of
SNRs is identified. In such a context, the payoff matrix A becomes:

A=

UC

SNR

UD

UC

α

α

δ

SNR

α

α

β−λ

UD

γ

β−ε

β

Observe that a UC-UD-SNR population may end up either in a ‘bad’ stationary state (the vertex UD), where
cooperators and strong reciprocators perish and all players are defectors, or in a ‘good’ stationary state
belonging to the edge joining the vertices UC and SNR (every point of such an edge is a stationary state)
where defectors perish, with positive proportions of cooperators and strong reciprocators. However, the latter
evolutionary outcome is fragile and the maintenance of cooperation may be jeopardized: if the share of SNRs
falls below a certain threshold in the polymorphic stationary states of the edge UC-SNR, such polymorphic
configurations can be invaded by defectors. This result is in line with past evolutionary work (Sethi and
Somanathan, 1996) and experimental evidence (Carpenter et al., 2004) revealing that when ‘sufficiently
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many’ punishers are initially present, free riders are likely to be matched with agents reducing their payoffs,
so that the former will be driven out of the population. At that point, since there will be no selection pressure
against punishing players, the population shares stabilize. In such a case, a polymorphism with a positive
proportion of two pro-social behavioral types (cooperators and (a high enough number of) punishers) and
universal cooperation prevails. In our analysis, we also find that, other things being equal, as defectors’ costs
of being punished increase, the basin of attraction of the vertex UD becomes smaller (see the Mathematical
Appendix). This can be seen as an evolutionary confirmation of what Sethi and Somanathan (1996) refer to as
the centrepiece of economic reasoning, that is “the tendency of human behaviour to adjust in response to
persistent differential in material incentives”.

Figure 2: Social dynamics in a population of Cooperators, Defectors and Altruistic Punishers

Altruistic Rewarders
This case represents a scenario where cooperators and defectors coexist with players driven by SPR, that is
conditional cooperators who are willing to incur costs to reward cooperators (altruistic rewarding), but abstain
from punishing defectors, unlike agents driven by SNR. In such case, the payoff matrix A is given by:

A=

UC

UC

SPR

UD

α

α +η

δ

α

β

β

β

SPR α − π
UD

γ

In their public goods experiment on endogenous institutional choice (carrot vs. stick), Sutter et al. (2010) find
that subjects typically vote for the reward option. In this case, our analytical model shows that the three types
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coexist in positive, permanently fluctuating proportions (Figure 3). Such a dynamics qualitatively resembles
one of the findings obtained in the well-known evolutionary paper on indirect reciprocity by Nowak and
Sigmund (1998), where it is shown that long-term simulations that incorporate mutations usually do not
converge to a simple equilibrium distribution of strategies, but display endless cycles, with defectors,
discriminators and cooperators. This is the only coexistence outcome we obtain (though we do not get an
attractive stationary state with coexistence), with reference to both behavioral types (as selfish and non-selfish
players coexist) and behavioral outcomes (as we observe both cooperation and defection, within the overall
population). By contrast, all the other four varieties of strong reciprocity we investigate lead to the survival of
either selfish or non-selfish (i.e. cooperators and/or strong reciprocators) players only, which either universal
defection or universal cooperation is associated with.

Figure 3: Social dynamics in a population of Cooperators, Defectors and Altruistic Rewarders

Players driven by Symmetric Strong Reciprocity
Let us now consider the dynamics associated with the case in which cooperators and defectors initially coexist
with conditional cooperators displaying SSR, that is the combination of altruistic punishment (punishment of
defectors) and altruistic rewarding (rewarding of cooperators; Fehr et al., 2002). In this case, the payoff matrix
A is:

A=

UC

SSR

UD

α

α +η

δ

α

β−λ

β−ε

β

SSR α − π
UD
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Here, we find that the stationary state UD, where all players are defectors, is a global attractor in the interior
of the simplex S (Figure 4). The strong result we obtain is that now complete free riding prevails regardless of
the proportion of non-selfish players (SRs and UCs) initially present in the population. The intuition, in a
nutshell, is that altruistic rewarding ‘crowds-out’ altruistic punishment. What happens in this case resembles
the well-known dynamics characterizing a classic prey-predator model, but within a cultural evolution
framework in which different cultural orientations compete with one another and evolution is driven by
material payoffs. Within the behaviorally heterogeneous framework under study, SSR is maladaptive due to
the key negative role played by the group of cooperators, as such players, by so doing, make themselves
vulnerable and exploitable on the part of UDs, so favoring their evolutionary success. As we have seen by
analyzing SNR, such an unpleasant social outcome can be prevented – provided that ‘sufficiently many’
punishers are initially present –, as SRs in that case abstain from rewarding cooperators. By contrast, with SSR
universal defection prevails regardless of the initial share of SRs in the population. Since selection favors
second-order free riders, strong reciprocity declines and eventually first-order free riders take over. This is a
crucial point which, though speculatively made (Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004) or investigated by means of
exploratory simulations (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003), had not received specific attention so far at the
analytical level.

Figure 4: Social dynamics in a population of Cooperators, Defectors
and players driven by Symmetric Strong Reciprocity

Punishers of (Non-Punishing) Cooperators
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Let us now turn to the dynamics associated with the existence of the ‘new’ form of strong reciprocity that we
label Punishment of Non-Punishing Cooperators (PNP), as in this case strong reciprocators are willing to
incur costs in order to punish cooperators – who unconditionally cooperate but fail to punish defectors,
therefore acting as second-order free riders – rather than defectors themselves (for a similar notion, see the
seminal paper by Axelrod, 1986). The payoff matrix A, in this case, becomes:

UC
A=

UC

α

PNP α − λ
UD

γ

PNP UD
α−ε

δ

α

β

β

β

Recent evidence from experimental games confirms that cooperative subjects get heavily punished (see e.g.
Denant-Boemont et al., 2007; Herrmann et al., 2008; Goette et al., 2010; Abbink et al., 2010)5. Also Gächter
and Herrmann (2010), in their large-scale experiment with subjects from urban and rural Russia, find a
surprisingly high rate of punishment of cooperators: as they correctly point out, “Punishment of cooperators
has been largely neglected in previous research on social preferences because it was negligible compared to
the punishment of free riders. Our results show that this neglect is not warranted because punishment of
cooperators can be very significant in some subject pools”. Our dynamic analysis for this case shows that now
the pure population stationary state where everyone is a PNP is a global attractor in the interior of S and
universal cooperation arises (Figure 5). Hence, such a seemingly paradoxical form of sanctioning turns out to
be successful in both endogenously enforcing cooperation and being sustainable over time.

5

Well-known real-life examples of this form of sanctioning include employer’s liability for injuries resulting from acts by her
employees within the scope of their duties as well as parents’ responsibility for harms to others caused by their younger children.
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Figure 5: Social dynamics in a population of Cooperators, Defectors and Punishers of (Non-Punishing) Cooperators

Hyper-Strong Reciprocators
We finally illustrate the dynamics in the context in which Hyper-Strong Negative Reciprocity (HSNR) is
present in the population. HSNR is a form of strong reciprocity represented by the combination of SNR and
PNP, as HSNRs abstain from rewarding other agents (unlike SPRs) and incur costs to punish both defectors
and cooperators, that is both first-order and second-order free riders. The payoff matrix A associated to this
case is:

A=

UC

UC

HSNR

UD

α

α−ε

δ

α

β−λ

β−ε

β

HSNR α − λ
UD

γ

When strong reciprocity takes the form of HSNR, so that SRs display both altruistic punishment of defectors
and punishment of non-punishers, in equilibrium either all players become defectors, so that universal
defection occurs, or all players become HSNRs, so that cooperation flourishes (Figure 6). This case resembles
the case of SNR, as also in such case we have found that initial conditions turn out to be crucial in order to
determine the evolutionary outcome. The key difference, however, is that with HSNR the cooperative
equilibrium is less fragile than with SNR, as it is associated with a monomorphic population rather than with a
polymorphic population that can be invaded by defectors6.

6

The well-known phenomenon of so called ‘collective punishment’ provides us with abundant real-life evidence on this variety of
strong reciprocity. For example, when something negative happens at school and neither the culprit confesses nor the innocent
schoolboys act as informers, the teacher may decide to punish the whole class. As far as HSNR is concerned, a significant
confirmation of its impact on the enforcement of cooperation in a multi-person prisoner’s dilemma is provided by simulation results
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).
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Figure 6: Social dynamics in a population of Cooperators, Defectors and Hyper-Strong Reciprocators

4. Discussion and concluding remarks
In recent years, the idea of strong reciprocity has been gaining more and more credit. The main reason of this
seems to lie in the appeal of a notion of endogenous sanctioning based on people’s willingness to perform
such actions despite the associated monetary costs. Experimental confirmations have generated even more
interest towards this behavioral attitude. One of the major results of our evolutionary analysis, however, is that
in the three-type population under study, where defectors, cooperators and strong reciprocators initially
coexist, if strong reciprocators display both altruistic punishment and altruistic rewarding (i.e. SSR), in
equilibrium all cooperators and punishers perish, so that universal defection eventually prevails. This ‘paradox
of strong reciprocity’, making a behavioral attitude such as SSR maladaptive and ineffective as a cooperation
enforcement device is due to the ‘crowding-out effect’ dynamically produced by altruistic rewarding on
altruistic punishment: rewarding second-order free riders (that is, cooperators) makes the latter vulnerable and
indirectly favors the expansion of first-order free riders (that is, defectors), who effectively exploit
cooperators. This makes SSR unsustainable and leads to the demise of cooperation. Fehr and Fischbacher
(2003) claimed that when cooperation in a population is widespread, altruistic punishers have only a small or
no selective disadvantage relative to pure cooperators who abstain from punishing. However, insofar as strong
reciprocity means not only costly punishment of defectors but also (symmetrically) costly rewarding of
cooperators, our study reveals that – when the proportion of cooperators is extremely large – the cost
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disadvantage of strong reciprocators is still relevant due to the fact that rewarding so many cooperators will be
costly – though the costs of punishing defectors will be small, in such a circumstance. The second (causally
related) problem is that such an increase of cooperators, together with the lack of a large number of strongly
reciprocal players around, makes cooperators extremely vulnerable to the ‘attack’ of defectors, who exploit
them and derive relevant advantages from this. This allows them to grow at the expense of cooperators and,
eventually, to take over and make the monomorphic pure population equilibrium where all agents defect
globally attractive.
Withholding reward to cooperators significantly improves the situation: passing from SSR to SNR makes
strong reciprocity less costly and cooperation sustainable through positive proportions of SRs and UCs. This is
in line with what happens in an indirect reciprocity scenario, where individuals benefit from withholding help.
We have also shown that when rewarding does not occur, punishing works better when both cooperators and
defectors are sanctioned (under HSNR) than when defectors only are sanctioned (SNR), as in the latter case,
even if costly rewarding does not occur, the locally attractive cooperative equilibria are fragile. However, the
adaptive power of strong reciprocity, as well as its capacity to favor the endogenous enforcement of
cooperation, are even greater when such behavioral attitude takes the form of PNP only, that is when strong
reciprocators simply sanction (non-punishing) cooperators and abstain from costly punishing defectors. On
the whole, then, our comparative analysis establishes the evolutionary superiority of some varieties of strong
reciprocity over others. We have seen that SNR, SPR and SSR perform badly and do not act as effective
cooperation enforcement devices, when they have to compete evolutionarily with unconditional cooperation
and unconditional defection. By contrast, PNP and HSNR survive and succeed in enforcing cooperation.
Hence, once the inherently plural nature of strong reciprocity is taken into account, it is necessary to specify
what is the variety of strong reciprocity one aims at incorporating in a theoretical model based on type
heterogeneity, as it would be otherwise impossible to draw unambiguous conclusions about the medium-long
run stability of this behavioral attitude.
Why is it the case that, within the same social environment and information scenario, some varieties of
strong reciprocity are adaptive while others are not? In a nutshell, our study suggests the following unified
answer: in a world in which defectors initially coexist with strong reciprocators and cooperators, the latter can
(paradoxically) be an obstacle to the stability of cooperation. The existence of cooperators as prey provides
benefits to defectors as predators. Hence, the best way for SRs to generate an environment of cooperation and
avoid to perish is to try to drive the cooperators to extinction: we show that a strategy by which strongly
reciprocal players punish cooperators is highly adaptive both on its own (i.e. PNP) and when combined with
punishment of first-order free riders (i.e. HSNR). On the contrary, a strategy by which SRs reward cooperators
is highly non-adaptive both on its own (i.e. SPR) and, even more so, when combined with punishment of
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defectors (i.e. SSR). The point is that due to both their being second-order free riders and their failing to
reward others, seemingly nice guys such as unconditionally cooperative players are in fact not so nice and
deserve the stick, rather than the carrot. These results are in line with recent theoretical work on indirect
reciprocity (Ohtsuki et al., 2009) as well as with experimental evidence (Dreber et al., 2008), indicating that
subjects who do not punish earn a lot (they are the ‘winners’), while punishers end up with low payoff levels
(they are the ‘losers’). Hence, punishment of cooperators becomes itself socially beneficial and, therefore,
‘altruistic’, while rewarding cooperators is socially harmful and can be viewed a ‘antisocial’.
Our findings suggest that cooperation can emerge due to the crucial role played by strong reciprocity but
also that, in societies with sizeable shares of unconditional cooperators, strong reciprocity can be successful
insofar as it takes the form of ‘punishment of cooperators’. Such an evolutionary account of cooperation is
based on an individual selection framework and is compatible with the presence, in the population, of
cooperative ‘good men’ who, by doing nothing, risk to favor the ‘triumph of evil’ (as the poet Burke famously
put it): unlike theories of cooperation based on altruistic punishment of defectors only, this explanation takes
into account the ‘dark’ side of (seemingly) other-regarding behavior and sheds light on the potential role of a
plural behavioral attitude such as strong reciprocity in effectively dealing with it.

Mathematical appendix
We analyze dynamics (2) by using Bomze’s (1983) classification for replicator equations. In order to present
social dynamics for all the five varieties of strong reciprocity we focus on, we have to consider five distinct
material payoff matrices, in correspondence with the five three-type populations under study, on the basis of
the material consequences from the two-stage PDCS game conveyed by Tables 1 and 2. All the five cases
illustrated in the main text of the paper are analyzed on the basis of the propositions we state here below. In
order to use Bomze’s classification, we need to re-write the payoff matrix (1) in the following form:

0 0

B = a b
d e
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0 
0
 
c  =  a 21 − a11
f   a31 − a11

0
a 22 − a12
a32 − a12



a 23 − a13 
a33 − a13 
0

(3)
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with the first row made of zeros7. Dynamics (2) is equivalent (Hofbauer 1981) to the Lotka-Volterra system:
•

x = x(a + bx + cy )
•

(4)

y = y (d + ex + fy )
by the coordinate transformation:
x1 =

1
x
y
, x2 =
, x3 =
1+ x + y
1+ x + y
1+ x + y

(5)

This coordinate change is sometimes used in the analysis below. Furthermore, we make use of the same
terminology used in Bomze (1983). By an eigenvalue EV of a stationary state we shall understand an
eigenvalue of the linearization matrix around that stationary state. The term EV in direction of the vector V
means that V is an eigenvector corresponding to that EV. IntS is the set {x ∈ S : xi > 0, i = 1, 2, 3} in which all
behavioral types are present in the population. An edge of S consists of all population states in which a given
(fixed) strategy is not adopted; we shall denote K ij the edge joining ei with e j , where e1 = (1,0,0) ,

e2 = (0,1,0) , e3 = (0,0,1) are the vectors of the canonical basis; e1 , e2 and e3 represent the states in which in
the population there are only UCs, SRs and UDs, respectively. Thus e.g. K 12 is the edge where only types UC
and SR are present in the population. Note that, by (5), K 12 corresponds to the positive semi-axis y = 0 of the
plane (x,y) and K 13 corresponds to the positive semi-axis x = 0 .
The stability properties of the vertices e1 , e2 and e3 (indicated, respectively, by UC, SR and UD in Figures 26) are analyzed in the following proposition8. For simplicity, the propositions in Bomze (1983) will be
indicated as B# (so, e.g., B4 is Proposition 4 of Bomze’s paper).

Proposition 1 The eigenvalue structure of the stationary states ei is the following:
(1) e1 has one eigenvalue with the sign of a in direction of K 12 and one eigenvalue with the sign of d in
direction of K 13 .
(2) e2 has one eigenvalue with the sign of − b in direction of K 12 and one eigenvalue with the sign of e − b
in direction of K 23 .

7

It is a well-known result that dynamics (2) does not change if an arbitrary constant is added to each column of A (see e.g. Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1988; p. 126).
8
All the eigenvalues of the stationary stateson the edges of S are real (see Bomze, 1983).
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(3) e3 has one eigenvalue with the sign of − f in direction of K 13 and one eigenvalue with the sign of c − f
in direction of K 23 .

Proof. See B1.

The following proposition concerns the stationary states on the edges of S.
Proposition 2 (1) K 12 is pointwise fixed9 if and only if (iff) a = b = 0 . There is a unique the stationary state in
the interior of K 12 iff ab < 0 . In the remaining cases, there are no the stationary states in it. The eigenvalues
of the unique the stationary state (when existing) have the sign of − a in direction of K 12 and of
(bd − ae) / b in direction of the interior of S.
(2) There are not the stationary states in K 13 .
(3) There is a unique the stationary state in the interior of K 23 iff (e − b)( f − c) < 0 . In the remaining cases,
there are not the stationary states in K 23 . The eigenvalues of the unique the stationary state in the interior of
K 23 have the sign of (e − b)( f − c) /(e − b + c − f ) in direction of K 23 and of (bf − ce) /(e − b + c − f ) in
direction of the interior of S.

Proof. Apply B2 and B5.

The remaining proposition concerns the stationary states in the interior of S, where all behavioral types
coexist.

Proposition 3 There is a unique the stationary state in IntS iff the expressions:
bf − ce

ae − bd

cd − af

(6)

have all the same sign and are not equal to zero.
If they are all zero, then there is a pointwise fixed line G = {( x, y ) : a + bx + cy = d + ex + fy = 0} in IntS (if the
intersection between G and the positive quadrant of the plane ( x, y ) is not empty). In the remaining cases,
there are not stationary states in IntS.

Proof. Apply B6.

Strong Negative Reciprocity (SNR)

9

The term pointwise fixed means that all the points of such an edge are stationary states.
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In such a case, the payoff matrix B (see (3)) becomes:

0 0

B = a b
d e


0  0
 
c= 0
f   γ − α

0
0

β −α −ε



β −δ − λ
β − δ 
0

In this case, by Propositions 1-3, we have that e3 (where all players are UDs) is always locally attractive and
the edge K 12 (where UDs are not present) is always pointwise fixed. Furthermore, there is always an isolated
stationary state in the edge K 23 which has two positive eigenvalues if λ > β − δ , one positive eigenvalue (in
direction of K 23 ) and one negative eigenvalue in direction of IntS if λ < β − δ . In the interior of S there are
not isolated stationary states while there exists a pointwise fixed line:
y=−

γ −α α + ε − β
+
x
β −δ
β −δ

(7)

iff λ = β − δ . Looking at all possible dynamic regimes showed in Bomze (1983), we can classify the
dynamics in a UC-SNR-UD population. In particular, if λ < β − δ we have the phase portrait number 28 in
Bomze’s (1983) classification (Bpp#, hereafter); if λ = β − δ we obtain Bpp3 and if λ > β − δ we obtain
Bpp23. For simplicity, in the paper we show only the dynamics related to the latter case (for the other two
cases, qualitative dynamics is very similar). Consequently, in a UC-SNR-UD population, a bi-stable dynamics
always emerges: the trajectories in the interior of S converge either to the stationary state e3 , where all players
are UDs, or to the edge K 12 , where UDs disappear and UCs and SNRs coexist (see Figure 2).
The following proposition leads to an intuitive result concerning the variations of the basins of attraction of e3
and K 12 when the parameter ɛ (capturing defectors’ cost of being punished by strong reciprocators) varies.

Proposition 4 As ɛ increases, the basin of attraction of the stationary state e3 gets smaller and, as a
consequence, the basin of attraction of K 12 gets larger.
Proof. In the case of SNR, if we write the dynamics in the coordinates (x,y) (see (5)), we obtain:
•

x = x( β − λ − δ ) y
•

y = y[γ − α + ( β − ε − α ) x + ( β − δ ) y ]

(8)

Therefore, the slope of the trajectories is given by the following expression:
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•

α + ε − β γ − α + (β − δ ) y
dy y
= • =−
+
dx x
β −λ −δ
(β − λ − δ ) x

(9)

Let us first consider the case λ < β − δ ; the basins of attraction of e3 and K 12 are separated by the unique
trajectories converging to the stationary state on the edge K 23 (see Bpp28 in Bomze, 1983). From (9) we get
that passing from ε 1 to ε 2 , with ε 1 < ε 2 , we obtain:
dy
dy
>
dx ε = ε
dx ε = ε
1
2
This implies that the trajectory Γ converging to the stationary state in K 23 for ε = ε 1 gets crossed top-down
from the trajectories of (8) for ε = ε 2 . This implies that the basin of e3 gets smaller and the basin of K 12 gets
larger, passing from ε 1 to ε 2 .
Let us now turn to the case λ = β − δ (see Bpp3 in Bomze, 1983); the basins of attraction of e3 and K 12 are
separated by the line (7). Since such line shifts upward (in the positive quadrant of the plane (x, y)) as ɛ
grows, we proved the proposition for such a dynamic regime as well.
Let us now turn to the case λ > β − δ ; in this case, there is only one trajectory starting from the stationary
state in K 23 (which is a repulsive) tangent to the edge K 12 ; the part Φ of this trajectory that goes from the
stationary state in K 23 to the edge K 12 separates the basins of attraction of e3 and of K 12 . Since for

λ > β − δ we have:
dy
dy
<
dx ε = ε
dx ε = ε
1
2
then the trajectory Φ for ε = ε 1 gets crossed top-down from the trajectories of (8) for ε = ε 2 . This implies
that the basin of e3 gets smaller and the basin of K 12 gets larger in passing from ε 1 to ε 2 .

Strong Positive Reciprocity (SPR)
In order to avoid a lengthy presentation of our calculations, we omit to write the payoff matrices B for this
case and for the following ones (the payoff matrices A are given in the main text). The procedure that allows
us to set them up should be clear now. The dynamics in a UC-SPR-UD population is characterized by the
following properties. There are not stationary states in the edges K ij of S and all the vertices ei are saddle
points. Furthermore, there always exists one stationary state in the interior of S; by applying Corollary 7 of B6
in Bomze (1983), it is easy to show that such a point is a source. Thus, in the case of a UC-SPR-UD
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population, we have the regime shown in Figure 3: all trajectories approach the boundary of S turning
clockwise.

Symmetric Strong Reciprocity (SSR)
We have that e3 (where all players are UDs) is always locally attractive. There are not stationary states in the
edges K 12 and K 13 ; there is always an isolated stationary state in the edge K 23 which has one positive
eigenvalue in direction of K 23 . In the interior of S, pointwise fixed lines do not exist (being ae − bd > 0
always) and one stationary state exists iff ( β − δ − λ )(α + ε + η − β ) > η ( β − δ ) ; in the other cases, no
stationary state exists in the interior of S. Consequently, by Bomze’s classification, we obtain two dynamic
regimes. In particular, when there exists a stationary state in the interior of S, the dynamic regime is Bpp15 in
Bomze (1983); if it does not exist, the dynamic regime is the one showed in Figure 3. In both dynamic
regimes, the stationary state e3 is globally attractive, so that we obtain the result illustrated in the paper.

Punishment of Non-Punishing Cooperators (PNP)
In this context, the stationary state e2 (where all players are PNPs) is always attractive while the other
vertices are saddles; there are not stationary states in the edges K 13 and K 23 and there is always one stationary
state in K12 which has a positive eigenvalue in direction of K 12 . Furthermore, there is a unique stationary
state in the interior of S iff λ ( β + ε − α ) < ε (α − γ ) ; in such a case, the stationary state in K 12 is a saddle. If

λ ( β + ε − α ) ≥ ε (α − γ ) , there are not stationary states in the interior of S and the stationary state in K12 is
repulsive. If the interior stationary state exists, the associated dynamic regime is Bpp15; otherwise, the
dynamic regime is the one showed in Figure 5. In both regimes, the stationary state e2 is a global attractor.

Hyper-Strong Negative Reciprocity (HSNR)
Here, the vertices e2 (where all players are HSNRs) and e3 (where all players are UDs) are always attractive
while e1 is always a saddle. There are not stationary states in K 13 and there is one stationary state in K 12 and
one in K 23 ; both these stationary states have a positive eigenvalue in direction of K 12 and K 23 , respectively.
The dynamic regimes, in the case of a UC-HSNR-UD population, depend on the sign of the following
expressions (see Proposition 3):
bf − ce = ε ( β − δ ) + (α − β )( β − δ − λ )
ae − bd = λ (α − β ) + ε (α − γ )
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cd − af = (γ − α )( β − δ − λ ) + λ ( β − δ )

In particular, we have the following sub-cases:
1) If bf − ce > 0 , ae − bd > 0 , cd − af > 0 , then there exists one stationary state in the interior of S which
is repulsive (see B6 and Corollary 7) and the stationary states in K 12 and in K 23 are saddles. The
corresponding dynamic regime is Bpp9.
2) If bf − ce = ae − bd = cd − af = 0 , then there exists one pointwise fixed line in the interior of S joining
the stationary states in K 12 and in K 23 . The corresponding dynamic regime is Bpp5.
3) bf − ce < 0 , ae − bd < 0 , cd − af < 0 , then there exists one stationary state in the interior of S which is
a saddle (see B6 and Corollary 7) and the stationary states in K 12 and in K 23 are repulsive. The corresponding
dynamic regime is Bpp10.
4) If bf − ce > 0 , ae − bd ≤ 0 , ∀ cd − af , then there are not stationary states in the interior of S, the
stationary state in K 12 is repulsive and that in K 23 is a saddle point. The corresponding dynamic regime is
Bpp37.
5) If bf − ce ≤ 0 , ae − bd > 0 , ∀ cd − af , then there are not stationary states in the interior of S, the
stationary state in K 12 is a saddle point and that in K 23 is repulsive. The corresponding dynamic regime is
Bpp38.
A representative scenario, with HSNR, is the one showed in Figure 6, corresponding to the phase portrait
Bpp38.
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